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TRUTH AS A WAY OF LIFE
BY COREY BEALS
At the Quaker Theological Discussion Group meetings in Denver,1we had a lively discussion that arose out of my review of Rosemary
Moore’s book, The Light in Their Consciences: The Early Quakers in
Britain, 1646-1666. In that review, I observed that her historical
methodology presupposed that no testimony of encounters with the
divine could be included as authentic in her explanatory accounts. So
any such testimony, according to her methodology, must be explained
in terms of some sort of deception, including the possibility of self-
deception. Further, her methodology presupposed that teleology2 had
no explanatory role to play when providing historical description. In a
written response to this criticism, Moore replied, “I was attempting to
write a book that would be acceptable in academic circles, and it is a
fact—unfortunate if you like—that God has to be left out of academic
discourse, and that teleology is almost equally unacceptable.”
3
Moore’s appeal to the fact of the exclusion of God and teleology
from academic circles does not, however, answer the criticism but mere-
ly shifts the criticism to those standards. If God and teleology must be
“left out of academic discourse” as she suggests, then such a move
makes the criticism apply more broadly. Why must God and teleology
be left out of academic discourse? I argued in the review4 that the long-
held presupposition that “talk about God was biased” was itself a pre-
supposition with a bias. To assume that “a secular worldview is neutral”
is itself a biased assumption which is not neutral. This assumption was,
in part, a result of having a narrow, reductionistic view of truth.
Many partaking in the discussion in Denver were intrigued by this
argument, but asked, ‘What alternative is available?’ Since we ran out of
time, and since this was a question that required more attention, I was
asked to address the topic in a subsequent session. What follows is my
response to that request. 
While many theories of truth have been suggested over the last two
hundred years, none of them has proven to be widely satisfactory.
Advances in science and technology have modified understandings of
some aspects of truth, but the larger questions still remain to be
addressed. Instead of rushing to give an alternative answer to the ques-
7
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tion, “What is truth?” time deserves to be spent looking at what is
wrong with the question itself. In looking at differing philosophical
views of truth that have been historically significant, most have suffered
from a similar flaw—a flaw that could be traced to the way the question
was being asked. Before turning to an analysis of the question, however,
I will begin by looking briefly at the prevalent answers that have received
the most attention. 
WHAT IS TRUTH?
There is much that could be said in reviewing the answers given to the
question of truth. Many books are dedicated to the subject, and I obvi-
ously cannot hope to do justice to the varieties and subtleties of each of
the theories of truth.5 In mentioning the major views, I want to focus on
two factors of each theory. First, I will ask what each theory says is the
‘truth-bearer.’ The truth-bearer is that about which we say something is
true. The main candidates for truth-bearers are sentences, statements
(assertions), beliefs (judgments) and propositions.6 Second, I will ask
what the theory identifies as the ‘truth-maker.’ The truth-maker is that
which makes the truth-bearer true. 
a. Correspondence Theories of Truth. Historically, the most wide-
spread theory of truth has been the correspondence theory of truth, which
simply put, is to say that truth is the correspondence between a proposi-
tion and reality. This is the view that was held by Aristotle, who famous-
ly defined truth saying that “To say of what is that it is and of what is not
that it is not, is true.”7 Many others have held this view, including
Aquinas, who defined truth saying, “truth is the adequation of reality and
the intellect.”8 That is, truth is when thought equals, or corresponds to,
reality. In each case, the truth-maker is reality. If the truth-bearer con-
forms to reality, then it is true; if not, then it is false. This correspondence
could work in multiple ways, and there are many varieties of correspon-
dence theories, some which make sentences or statements as the truth-
bearer and others that make propositions as the truth-bearer. Many of the
medieval philosopher/theologians allowed for many possible truth-bear-
ers and did not require that we choose just one type of truth-bearer.
Aquinas even held that things could be truth-bearers. So there was a wide
understanding of what could count as a truth-bearer.
In the 17th century, however, the ‘principle of parsimony,’ otherwise
known as ‘Ockham’s razor,’ came to be the intellectual tool of choice.
This principle of parsimony takes various forms, but is popularly defined
2
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as the counsel that says, “Do not multiply explanations unnecessarily.”
The effect of this drive to eliminate any apparently unnecessary explana-
tion had a significant impact upon theories of truth. Seeking monolog-
ical explanations led to various reductive accounts of truth-bearers,
saying that only sentences are truth-bearers, or that only statements or
beliefs were truth-bearers. Regardless of what a theory said about the
truth-bearer, it usually was in response to the question, “what is the
truth-bearer?” and it usually provided just one answer. Since the
assumption was that the simplest answer was the best, this led corre-
spondence theorists and most others to posit just one truth-bearer. 
b. Coherence Theories of Truth. Another type of theory is known
as the coherence theory of truth. Coherence theories of truth identify a
person’s beliefs as the truth-bearers. This was in no small part driven by
challenges of skepticism and the of lack confidence it brought in our abil-
ity to know facts about reality external to us. But since beliefs were some-
thing with which we could have direct contact, beliefs became the only
candidates for what we could know. If we can only have sure access to our
own beliefs, then what is it that could be the truth-maker? Coherentists
have suggested that what made particular beliefs true was a belief’s lack
of contradiction with other beliefs. According to coherentism, if a belief
is consistent—or coherent—with all other beliefs, then it is true. There are
many difficulties with such a view, however. One problem is that coher-
entism is concerned with avoiding contradiction within a particular sub-
ject’s set of beliefs, so a particular belief could be consistent with one
person’s belief system but contrary to another person’s belief system. This
view makes the truth of any belief almost entirely particular to the per-
spective of the person holding that belief, forcing one toward relativism.9
Another obvious problem with this is that most can think of coher-
ent belief systems which though internally consistent, are wrong.
Nihilism is a very coherent belief system, for example, but many are hes-
itant to say that the belief that “it is good to eliminate weak people” is
true for the person holding it simply because it is consistent with his
nihilist belief system. One’s views can thus be entirely coherent, but at
the same time flawed, and even wrong.
c. Pragmatic Theories of Truth. Reacting against the coherentists’
claim that consistency with one’s belief system is the truth-maker, the
pragmatist theorists of truth show that coherentism allows for foolish (or
useless) consistencies. Pragmatists seek to find a theory of truth that
makes truth useful for life. One type of pragmatism, instrumentalist
pragmatism, locates truth in the ability of a proposition to bring about
successful results. This utilitarian view of truth does not see successful
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results as a sign of truth but identifies the success it brings about as that
which makes it true. 
William James, in defining truth, said that “the possession of true
thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of
action” (p. 78), and his view of truth can be summarized by saying that
a belief is true if and only if it is useful to believe it. Thus, beliefs are usu-
ally taken to be the truth-bearers, and the truth-maker is the success that
the belief causes for the one who holds that belief. While there are sever-
al historical and contemporary versions of pragmatism, and much could
be said about these various views, one obvious flaw with these views is
that they make truth highly relative to the person holding the beliefs,
since in order to determine the truth of a belief one must first find out for
whom the belief is useful. Also, it is not enough to ask whether the belief
is useful; one must also ask, “useful for what purpose?” Clearly, identical
beliefs could be useful for one purpose but not for another purpose, mak-
ing truth contingent upon what purpose is intended. Further, even if the
same purpose is agreed upon, a particular belief could be useful for one
person while simultaneously lacking usefulness for another.
d. Deflationary Theories of Truth. A group of theories has
emerged lately which treat the topic of truth, but unlike the theories
above, these do not hold truth to be a substantive property. These views
are called deflationary theories of truth, and they deny that talk about
truth has the significance usually attributed to it; they therefore attempt
to deflate the notion of truth altogether. Deflationary theorists are not
trying to identify what it is that makes a sentence true, so much as they
are trying to describe what makes people speak of truth in such grand
ways when ‘truth’ is an empty property. Deflationists argue that people
falsely think they are saying something substantive when they say some-
thing is ‘true.’ One way that deflationists explain such statements is to
say truth statements merely add a redundancy into our language.
According to some deflationary views, to say “it is true that there is cat
on the mat” is no different than saying “there is a cat on the mat.” These
views deny that the many ways we speak of truth actually add meaning
to what we are saying, and it is for this reason that they are called ‘defla-
tionary’ accounts of truth. Since these accounts usually give explanations
of ‘truth’ in terms of linguistic functions, the ‘truth-bearers’ are usually
sentences. What is unique about these accounts, though, is that because
they are not saying that truth is a substantive property, there is no ‘truth-
maker’ in the sense that other theories of truth propose a truth-maker. 
A significant problem with these views is that they contradict what
humans have experienced and communicated throughout history. A
4
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deflationary theorist would think that any talk of truth as a significant
property is a mere deception and little more than a linguistic function
like a repeated sentence. In that sense, such a theorist is deconstructive
of all claims to truth, even authentic ones.
e. Constructivist Theories of Truth. In contrast to deflationary
views of truth which contradict and downplay human experience, some
theorists, which I will refer to broadly as constructivists, insist on the cen-
trality and validity of human experience. The constructivist’s apparent
respect for the human experience of truth is seen by the fact that they
view truth as a human creation. There are many different versions of con-
structivism, but what they all share in common is that they view truth as
a human creation or construct. Various views ascribe different truth-bear-
ers, but a common candidate is the sentence. The truth-maker in some
cases is the individual, but more frequently truth is said to be a social con-
struction. For some, like Ernest Becker, humans find freedom in their
ability to create truth, and in their ability to realize that truth is their own
creation. “The most astonishing thing of all, about man’s fictions, is not
that they have from prehistoric times hung like a flimsy canopy over his
social world, but that he should have come to discover them at all.”10 The
great achievement that the constructivist claims is not only that truth is
constructed by humans, but that we are aware of this fact. 
For other constructivists, like Michel Foucault,11 truth is constructed
as a strategy for exercising power over others. While some locate this
truth-creating capacity within the individual, many others attribute this
construction to social groups.12 Pointing to the fact that a consensus (of
rational adults with sufficient experience to make judgments) is the
truth-maker, Richard Rorty has notoriously commented that truth is
“what your peers will let you get away with saying.” Quakers might be
tempted to embrace this view, since it appears to be upholding consen-
sus as the ideal. But we should be cautioned that this is not just saying
that consensus is a way of testing or confirming truth—this view says
that truth is determined by what is agreed upon. 
Rorty also says that “Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist inde-
pendently of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, or be
out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not.
Only descriptions of the world can be true or false.”13 Here we can see
that truth-bearers for Rorty are limited to descriptions of the world—
sentences, and it is not the reality of the world that makes the sentences
true or false. According to the constructivist, it is we humans who make
some sentence true or false.
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Variations of the constructivist views of truth are given by various
postmodern accounts of truth; some are aimed directly against science,
suggesting that even the claims of science are nothing but the result of
cultural construction. Of course one problem that such a view faces is
the scenario in which the majority is wrong. As Doug Gwyn has said,
“truth is not determined by majority vote.” 
CORRECT AND CORRECTED
For each of the theories above, I have only briefly mentioned some of
the most intuitively obvious problems, but each one is saddled with
many deep and intractable philosophical problems as well that have been
much discussed in the literature. Each of the views has its adherents
because each of them has some ring of truth about them, but I find none
of them to be fully satisfactory. Some views, such as the deflationary the-
ories popular among analytical philosophers today, deny that I can be
correct about my experiences of truth and even suggest that my desire
for truth is misguided. Quakers, however, have held that we do have
some access to truth. The testimony to inward light affirms this. 
As a reaction to many of these theories which deny the validity of
human experience of truth, theories such as coherence, pragmatism and
constructivism suggest that the truth is created by me—either by my sys-
tem of beliefs, my pragmatic purposes, or my act of constructing mean-
ing. These theories do what the other theories did not do—they respect
the validity of human experience. However, they do so to such a degree
that they do not allow me to be accountable to truth outside of myself.
As unpleasant as it may be, I know that I need to be challenged and cor-
rected. It is important to acknowledge that I have access to truth—that
I can see truth. But inward light does not mean complete light. We see
through a glass, but nonetheless we see through a glass darkly. Thus, if
I am the creator of truth, this denies what I intuitively, historically, and
biblically know to be true—that I can be wrong. 
Furthermore, a world in which I construct the truth is a lonely
world. As poet Richard Wilbur wrote in the poem called “On Having
Misidentified a Wildflower,” “A thrush because I’d been wrong, /Burst
rightly into song/In a world not vague, not lonely, /Not governed by
me only.”14
I thus came to a deep dissatisfaction with the theories of truth cur-
rently on offer. I longed to have a world in which I could be wrong, but
each of the views that allowed me to be corrected denied that I could be
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correct about even some of my experience of truth. Likewise, the views
that allowed me to be correct about my experiences denied me the abil-
ity to be truly corrected. Thus I found that none of these views of truth
spoke to my condition.
WAYS WE COMMONLY SPEAK FOR TRUTH
Before turning to the evaluation of these various theories of truth, I want
to pause to ask why we make theories of truth. Don’t we theorize about
experiences in order to better understand those experiences? What hap-
pens when we abstract the object of study to a theory, and then use the
theory to deny what it was that gave rise to the theory to begin with? 
Are the theories not generated by looking at the various ways in
which we speak of truth? Are the theories not abstracted from particular
instances of truth? Why do we cling to a theory, even at the cost of deny-
ing the very thing that generated the theory to begin with? Instead of
clinging to our theory saying, “so much the worse for truth,” why don’t
we cling to our strongest intuitions of truth, which we sought to under-
stand, and say, “So much the worse for my theory of truth!”? In light of
this, let us look at the ways we speak of truth and see how the various
views handle some common ways we use the word ‘true.’
a. Truth-Bearers. In looking at the various ways these theories
describe what counts as a truth-bearer, one thing is overlooked. In asking
whether sentences, beliefs or propositions are the proper truth-bearers,
the question assumes that it is just one of those. But even a brief look at
the way we use the word ‘true’ shows that truth-bearers are not limited
to these few options. We often speak of people as being truth-bearers of
one type or another. For example, we often speak of a ‘true friend,’ or an
athlete who is ‘tried and true,’ or aspire to be a ‘true servant.’ We also
speak of a ‘true piece of lumber,’ or of steel with a ‘true temper,’ or
weights hung so as to make a ‘balance true.’ A lyre might be out of tune
until it is tuned and made ‘true.’ There are many such examples of speak-
ing about truth that allow people, or even things, to be truth-bearers.
When we refer to people or things as truth-bearers, it comes as no sur-
prise, and in fact it seems quite fitting that we should do so. But why have
our choices of truth-bearers been so drastically reduced over the last sev-
eral hundred years? And, has this enriched our discourse and strength-
ened our understanding of truth, or has it weakened our understanding
of ourselves and the world we live in? 
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While I appreciate the clarity and insight that often comes from
philosophical analysis and reflection, it seems to me that we have limit-
ed the possible field of truth-bearers because sentences and propositions
are easier to analyze. Why deprive ourselves from the richness of a wider
variety of possible truth-bearers for the sake of a false sense of clarity and
simplicity?
In fact, it might be argued that disallowing persons to be truth-bear-
ers is in part what has led us to embrace such unsatisfactory theories of
truth. Perhaps those who have had a strong sense of human experience
as a part of truth have incorporated human experience in the wrong
place. Constructivists, for example, have identified human experience as
the truth-maker when their intuitions could have been better served by
identifying humans as a possible truth-bearer. Likewise, those with
strong intuitions about the corrective claim of truth over the person
have tried to protect the objectivity of truth by denying the validity of
human experience as related to truth. Perhaps allowing humans to be
truth-bearers would provide a way through this impasse.15
b. Truth-Makers or Truth-Markers? Another mistake common to
most of these contemporary views is to confuse truth-markers with
truth-makers. By truth-marker, I mean that which is a mark—or a sign—
of truth. For example, incoherence is a likely sign or marker of falsity, just
as coherence is a possible sign of truth. But coherence is not sufficient
for truth—so coherence is a marker of truth, but it is not a maker of
truth. Likewise, the pragmatic success of a belief may be a mark of its
truth—a sign that it may indeed be true, but this does not make the
belief true. A belief may work because it is true, but belief is not true sim-
ply because it works.
Those of us who have a synthesizing urge will be tempted to say of
the various truth-makers previously mentioned, “Well it’s not one—it’s
a combination of ALL of them.” But is that right? Each is still a marker,
and simply combining the whole lot of them does not change the fact
that they are truth markers, not makers. Before looking at how we might
understand what makes truth-bearers true, I want to look briefly at one
key factor that has been largely ignored.
c. Truth as Relational. In asking what property makes truth-bear-
ers true, the question has been framed such that we look either to the
object or the subject. Parker Palmer is one of the few voices suggesting
that truth is not something that is made either by the subject or the
object, but that it is made by a fundamental relation that comprises
8
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object and subject together. He says that truth goes far beyond the mere
ascription of properties to objects or subjects and he argues that “truth
is neither ‘out there’ nor ‘in here,’ but both. “Truth is between us, in
relationship, to be found in the dialogue of knowers and knowns who
are understood as independent but accountable selves.”16 This relation-
al view of truth may help us understand what Jesus meant when he said,
“I am the way, and the truth, and the life.”17 Truth is not merely grasp-
ing something but involves being grasped by someone. A few isolated
voices18 have recently accentuated this relational aspect of truth, but
more can be said about this, and it seems to me that Quakers, with a tra-
dition to draw upon, can help lead the way toward seeing truth as a rela-
tional way of life. 
CONCLUSION
While I will not here take on the task of positing and defending a theo-
ry of truth, I will suggest that much can be gained by looking at truth
differently than has been the pattern over the last several hundred years.
I should make it clear that I am not seeking a theory of truth so that I
can tell others they are wrong and I am right. I am looking for a view
of truth that will allow me to be correct about my inward sense of light,
but that will also allow me and my beliefs to be corrected. I am looking
for a theory of truth that will help me see when and how I am being false
to God and to others so that I can be a true servant and a true child of
the light.
Long before much of philosophy was reduced to linguistic games
and the analysis of properties, philosophy—in the Socratic tradition—
was concerned with a way of life. Long before Christianity was reduced
to a list of propositions, it was called ‘the Way.’ How is truth a ‘way’?
Many people in various academic disciplines are just beginning to be dis-
satisfied with reductionistic views of truth. Longing for a return to see-
ing truth as a way of life, some may ask what Quakers have to contribute
since Friends have had a history of embracing a holistic view of truth.
What will we have to say? How will our ways of walking in truth give
testimony to the truth? I hope that we will not rely on actions alone. I
hope we will not rely on propositions alone. I hope that truth as a way
of life will include the pursuit of true thoughts, true words and true
deeds, and that none of us will have to travel this path alone.
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NOTES
1. This discussion of truth was presented at the QTDG in Toronto in November 2002, and
this reference is to the QTDG that took place in Denver in November 2001.
2. To rule out teleology (telos means “end” or “goal”) as having any explanatory role is to
exclude the possibility that a person’s inherent or designed purpose helps us understand
that person’s behavior. An example of a human telos is to say that the chief end (telos) of
humans is to love God and enjoy him forever. Some reject this notion because they assume
we can understand an event without using this explanation. Others simply reject that
humans have a telos, and still others argue that the goal of humans is either self-actualiza-
tion or personal advancement and survival. 
3. This is from the written reply to my review.
4. See Quaker Religious Thought #s 99 &100, 2003, pp. 45-66.
5. For a detailed review of the major theories of truth along with analysis of those views, see
Frederick F. Schmitt, Theories of Truth, Blackwell Readings in Philosophy 13 (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Pub., 2003). See also Frederick F. Schmitt, Truth: A Primer (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1995). Another source with representative essays on different views of truth
is Simon Blackburn and Keith Simmons, Truth, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford /
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). The Oxford collection, however, is not as rep-
resentative of the variety of views and contains more essays on deflationary views of truth
due to the fact that such views are most popular in current analytical philosophy.
6. A sentence differs from a statement in that a sentence is here referring to that which is writ-
ten, whereas a statement refers to that which is spoken. A proposition is more general, and
is roughly described as the content to which sentences, beliefs and statements refer. For a
detailed discussion of truth-bearers see chapter one of William P. Alston, A Realist
Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
7. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 6, 1001b, p. 28.
8. Aquinas, ST., Q. 16, De Veritate Q.1, A.1&3.
9. This and several other serious problems can be seen developed at length Schmitt, Theories of
Truth, pp. 11-16.
10. Ernest Becker, “The Fragile Fiction,” in The Truth About the Truth: De-Confusing and Re-
Constructing the Postmodern World (New York: Putnam, 1995), p. 35.
11. Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-1977 (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980).
12. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise
in the Sociology of Knowledge, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966).
13. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge / New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), p. 5.
14. Richard Wilbur, New and Collected Poems, 1st ed. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1988), p. 12.
15. Although I do not have the space to treat fully this topic here, I hope to explore elsewhere
in further detail the implications of allowing humans, and even things, to be truth-bearers. 
16. Parker J. Palmer, To Know as We Are Known (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1983), pp. 55-
6.
17. John 14:6, NRSV. 
18. In addition to Parker Palmer, see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1962). See also Marjorie
Grene, The Knower and the Known (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
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